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However, this conception is far from being consensual in XXI century. Failed, inadequate, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures have sabotaged the economic well being, violated the basic human rights, and undermined the physical security of their populations. That’s why the notion of sovereignty gradually moves from the classical conception of being absolute to relative: sometimes contingent, sometimes conditional and other times shared. This paper intents to consider modern sovereignty concepts suggested in order to deal with failed states.
ABSTRACT 2
1. THE DEFINITION OF SOVEREIGNTY 3
2. A NEW APPROACH TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY. 4
2.1 WHY DO STATES FALL 4
2.2 THE DEFINITION OF FAILED STATE 5
2.3 THE NEW FORMS OF SOVEREIGNTY FOR FALLEN STATES 6
CONCLUSION 9
REFERENCES: 10
Shared sovereignty means engagement of external forces in some domestic authority structures to improve domestic sovereignty for indefinite period of time, and it compromises foremost the Westphalian sovereignty. It might be realized through multilateral agreements and treaties between recognized national authorities, IGO16 (i.e. IMF or WB) and governmental or even private interested parties. To be effective, such arrangements would have to create self-enforcing equilibrium involving either domestic players alone or some combination of domestic and international actors. Political elites in the target state would have to believe that they would be worse off if the shared sovereignty arrangement were violated. Shared sovereignty agreements have been used in the past. As a successful example we may consider Germany after World War II. The western allies wanted to internationally legitimate the Federal Republic of Germany, but at the same time constrain its freedom of action. The Bonn Agreements, signed in 1952 by the FRG, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France and revised in Paris in 1954, gave FRG full authority over its internal and external affairs but with key exceptions in the security area. Not only did the FRG renounce its right to produce chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, it also signed a status of forces agreement that gave the allies expansive powers. These included exclusive jurisdiction over the members of their armed forces and the right to patrol public areas including roads, railways, and restaurants. Allied forces could take any measures necessary to ensure order and discipline. The 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany terminated the Bonn Agreements.
One recent arrangement, that includes elements of shared sovereignty, although in diluted form, is the program associated with the development of oil resources in Chad and the pipeline that carries this oil through Cameroon to the Atlantic. Both Chad and Cameroon have been badly governed. Years of war, dictatorship, and sluggish economic performance have contributed as astonishing level of poverty, human rights record has been strongly criticized by the international community. While oil was first discovered in 1975, Chad had not been able to exploit its natural resources because of unstable conditions. In the 1990s, an oil company consortium led by Exxon wanted to develop Chad's oil but feared not only that the Chad and Cameroon governments might void any contract but also that they would be subject to public criticism and court action by human rights and environmental groups. Because of these fears, the oil companies insisted on the involvement of the World Bank as a minority partner, an involvement that they hoped would lessen any chances of unilateral contract revisions and provide cover for, perhaps even improve, human rights and environmental performance.17The World Bank in turn insisted on a quite modest degree of shared sovereignty. The most innovative aspect of the project was the World Bank’s insistence on a revenue management system. An independent oversight committee International Advisory Group, which included members from civil society was created to track and monitor the funds generated by oil exports. The chair of the five-member group, which includes a former deputy minister in the Canadian government, a Dutch agricultural specialist, an American anthropologist, and an African NGO leader, is Mamaou Lamine Loum, a former Senegalese prime minister. Chad and Cameroon could not have completed the project without the oil companies, and the companies would not have invested without the involvement of the World Bank. The bank, unlike the companies, had legitimacy, which allowed it to negotiate conditions related to Chad’s domestic institutional structures.18
As in the case of occupation, the most promising spheres for shared sovereignty, such as monetary policy and commercial courts, would not require substantial resources from external actors but would generate adequate domestic support. In collapsed or near-collapsed states, however, external actors would have to provide resources at least for some period of time. This would open additional possibilities for shared sovereignty for activities funded by external donors. A committee composed of national officials and individuals appointed by the education ministries of major donor countries might make, for instance, decisions about educational curriculum. Thus some form of de facto protectorates and, more promising, shared sovereignty are policy tools that could be added to the meager selection that is now available to deal with bad governance or to create effective institutions following military occupations. Legitimacy for shared sovereignty would be provided by the agreement of those exercising the target state's international legal sovereignty.
The idea of sovereignty is still one of the most difficult and controversial among others in the modern system of international relations. As J. Joffe says in his “Rethinking of the National State: The Different Meanings of Sovereignty”: “In international politics, no concept is less understood and more misused than that of sovereignty.” Moreover, the changes in world power balance, the terrorism threat as well as globalisation continuously create incentives for more and new notions about sovereignty and national state. Alongside with growing concern of developed countries on the human rights and international security, pundits propose a certain range of new forms of shared authority for fallen states. However, like virtually every other institutional arrangement that can be imagined, shared sovereignty has been tried before. There were specific configurations of power and interest that led stronger actors to introduce shared sovereignty arrangements, and weaker ones to accept them.
The idea about the long–term violation of international and Westphalian sovereignty in order to help to restore the domestic one in a failed state on the one hand sounds virtuous. It resembles the new idea that the principle of state sovereignty must not be higher than the human rights of the citizens, which was proposed by the former UN secretary general Kofi Annan and implies that if the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of individuals come into conflict, the international community shall defend the former one over the latter.19 But on the other hand, it needs the solution of dilemma between inviolability of state sovereignty and the moral imperative to act forcefully in the face of gross violations of human rights. Today it is widely agreed that the state sovereignty is no longer designed to protect a Sovereign, but in a large part of the world it has become a concept for the protection of peoples: individuals and collectivities. Yet the criteria and rules of the intervention and establishing the new forms of sovereignty on the territory of the failed state are not circumscribed by now, neither the clear explanation of what “failed state” means. The decision–makers must be very precise with definitions, furthermore, the latter must be codified. Then, there are several basic questions need to be raised and solved, such as: who will appoint the outside authority, who decides on the effective term of trusteeship or shared sovereignty and which measures should be taken by local and international actors. After all, it is absolutely necessary to cede the control and monitoring of such forms of sovereignty to International Organizations, for instance, the UN Security Council or US Peace Building Commission, and not to vest single states with a right to pursue a policy on the entrusted territory. Frankly speaking, the discussions about erosion of conventional sovereignty and so–called “responsibility to intervene” to stop the human rights violations are often initiated by some states which never give up a small piece of their own authority. I believe, in the future the state sovereignty must retain given that it will face more and more towards the protection of the inhabitants of the states as well as their human rights.
1 Stephen D. Krasner “New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States”, International Security, Vol.29, No 2 (Fall, 2004), pp. 85–120, P. 92
2 D.C. North “Institutions”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.5, No1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 91–112, p. 105
3 C. Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, Cambridge University Press, 1985
p. 172
4 C. Tilly, p. 186
5 D.C. North “The State in Economic History”, p. 253
6 C. Tilly, p. 184
7 C. Tilly, p. 186
8 C. Krasner, p. 91
9 D. Potter “State Responsibility, Sovereignty and Failed States”, AU Political Studies Association Conference Paper, 2004
10 www.worldbank.org/wbi/
11 D. Potter, p.8
12 D. Potter, p.8
13 D. Potter, p.9
14 C. Krasner, p. 94
15 C. Krasner, p. 99
16 International–Governmental Organizations
17 C. Krasner, p.28
18 C. Krasner, p.29
19 K. Annan “Two Concepts of Sovereignty” The Economist, 18 September 1999